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If there has been a contribution of Belgium to the practice of international arbitration, beyond 
that of its renowned arbitrators,2 it is probably by the lessons which may be drawn from the 
infamous Distribution Act of 1961.3 As is well-known, this Act creates a very favorable legal 
regime  for  distributors  who  are  granted  the  right  to  represent  a  foreign  manufacturer  in 
Belgium 4 – at least for those who have concluded a contract for an indefinite period of time. 
In a nutshell, the distributor enjoys, if the contract is terminated by the manufacturer, the right  
to claim compensation provided it demonstrates that the notice period is not sufficient in light 
of the duration of the relationship between parties.5 On top of this, the distributor may also 
claim an indemnity covering, among other elements, the value of the clients generated by the 
distributor, which remains with the manufacturer after the termination, and the various costs 
and  investments  which  the  distributor  incurred  for  the  purpose  of  exploiting  the 
distributorship.6
Due in part  to  the very generous amounts  courts  have granted on the basis  of  these two 
provisions,  this  Act  has  stirred  up  much  debate.  Its  impact  on  arbitration  of  distribution 
agreement disputes has been explored at length countless times, not the least by Professor van 
Houtte.  This  contribution  seeks  to  draw  lessons  from  the  rich  case  law  of  the  Belgian 
Supreme Court  in  this  field,  focusing on the latest  development  in the case of  Sebastian 
International.7 It will first offer some considerations on the process whereby a court looks at 
arbitrability before turning to the consequences, for the parties at hand, of the uncertainty 
surrounding arbitrability.
Before doing so, it is worth recalling briefly the various steps in the case law of the Supreme 
Court which have led to the recent ruling in the Sebastian International case. In a first ruling, 
1 Professor of Law, University of Liège.
2 And of some notable efforts by legislator in 1985 to attract more arbitration. In 1985, Parliament modified the 
arbitration act to provide that an application for setting aside an award could not be introduced before a 
Belgian court if none of the parties to the dispute was a Belgian national, a person residing in Belgium or a 
company formed under Belgian law or having its seat in Belgium. See  H. van Houtte,  'La loi belge sur 
l'arbitrage international', REV.  ARBITRAGE (1986),  29-42. As it  stands today, the text  of  Art.  1717 para.  4  
Judicial Code reads as follows : “Parties may, by an explicit declaration in the arbitration agreement or by a 
later agreement, exclude any application for the setting aside of an arbitral award, in case none of them is a 
physical person of Belgian nationality or a physical person having his normal residence in Belgium or a legal 
person having its principal seat or a branch office in Belgium.”
3 Act of July 27, 1961.
4 Whether the territory granted to the distributor is limited to Belgium or also includes other territories.
5 Article 2 provides that the distributor may claim an “equitable” indemnity in lieu of a reasonable notice 
period. Courts have proven very generous in granting such indemnity, which is calculated on periods of up to 
36 months. This rule does not apply if the distribution agreement is terminated following a serious fault 
committed by the distributor.
6 Article 3.
7 Sebastian  International  Inc.  v  Common  Markets  Cosmetics NV  (Court  of  Cassation,  14  Jan.  2010), 
RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD. (2010-11) at p. 1087, with comments by D. Mertens.
the Supreme Court held in 1979 that an award issued by an arbitral tribunal with its seat in 
Switzerland, could not be recognized in Belgium if it appeared that the arbitrators had not 
applied Belgian law.8 In the case at hand, the award has been issued on the basis of German 
law, which had been chosen by the parties in their contract.9 The Supreme Court relied chiefly 
on Art. 5(2) of the 1958 New York Convention.10
In a later ruling, the Court explored the consequences of the 1961 Act on motions seeking to 
have Belgian courts declining jurisdiction in favor of arbitration. It held that a dispute relating 
to the termination of a distribution agreement could not be referred to arbitration when it 
appeared that arbitrators were not bound to apply Belgian law.11
If the Court had shed some light on the impact of the 1961 Act, the picture was, however, far 
from complete. After this first series of rulings, it indeed remained unclear which law should 
be applicable to the arbitrability issue. This provoked much debate in the literature and in 
court practice : while it was argued that the question should be decided on the basis of the law 
governing the contract,12 this view was challenged by others who pleaded for the possibility 
for the court to take into account the lex fori.13
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule again on this issue starting in 2004. In a first  
decision, the Supreme Court quashed the decision whereby a Court of appeal had referred 
exclusively to Swiss law, the law governing the contract, to determine whether a dispute could 
be referred to arbitration.14 However, the reasoning did not firmly indicate that the arbitrability 
issue should be examined solely on the basis of Belgian law. The Court's ruling rather seemed 
to indicate that it  was unacceptable to exclude altogether the application of the  lex fori.15 
Further, there was an untimely reference to public policy, which obscured the reasoning.16
8 Audi-NSU Auto Union AG v SA Adelin Petit & Cie (Court of cassation, June 28, 1979), 5 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 
257 (1980).
9 The case has been discussed by  H. van Houtte, 'L'arbitrabilité de la résiliation des concessions de vente 
exclusive', in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À R. VANDER ELST (Nemesis 1987), pp. 821-833.
10 The reasoning of  the court  was also tied to  the issue of  fraud,  as it  had been alleged that  the German  
manufacturer had fraudulently attempted to avoid the application of Belgian law by choosing Swiss law to 
govern the contract signed with the distributor. The issue of fraud did not come back in later rulings.
11 Gutrob Werke GmbH v Usinorp de Saint-Hubert and Saint Hubert Gardening (Court of cassation, Dec. 22, 
1988). In that case, parties to the distribution agreement had not specified which law governed their contract.
12 See e.g. Company M v. M. S.A. (Brussels Court of Appeal 4 Oct. 1985), 14 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 618 (1989) 
(holding that “when the arbitrability of the dispute is considered from the point of view of the validity of the  
arbitration agreement, i.e. when the issue arises … before a court requested to decide only on this issue … it  
will be sufficient …. to ascertain whether the law of autonomy authorizes the submission of the dispute to  
arbitration”); and Société van Hopplynus v. Coherent Inc. (Commercial Court of Brussels, Oct. 5, 1994) 22 
YEARB. COMM. ARB. 637 (1997) (holding that the non-arbitrability must be governed by the law applicable to 
the contract and in particular by the law chosen by the parties, because “submitting the issue of the validity of  
the arbitral clause to the same law as the law governing the recognition or enforcement of the award does not  
lead to any coherent solution” (at p. 641)).
13 See e.g. Matermaco SA v PPM Cranes Inc et al. (Commercial Court of Brussels, Sept. 20, 1999) 25 YEARB. 
COMM. ARB. 673 (2000) (refusing to stay litigation in favor of arbitration although the contract included an  
arbitration agreement calling for disputes to be arbitrated with the application of the laws of Wisconsin; the 
court  hel  that  “The similarity  between Art.  II(1)  and  Art.  V(2)(a)  and  a  consistent  interpretation of  the 
convention require that the arbitrable nature of a dispute be determined, under the said Arts. II and V, under 
the same law, that is, the lex fori”).
14 Colvi v Interdica, (Court of Cassation, Oct. 15, 2004) 31 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 587 (2006).
15 The Court  stressed that  Art.  2(3)  of  the Convention “allows the state  court  seized with this question to 
consider the matter under its own law”.
16 The Court noted that a court in Belgium could exclude arbitrability “if the public policy of its legal system 
would otherwise be violated” – this was considered with some puzzlement as it is accepted that the 1961 Act 
does not belong to public policy.
In 2006, the Supreme Court had again the opportunity to shed some light on the relationship 
between arbitration and the 1961 Distribution Act.17 The Court went further and decided that 
when the agreement is governed by a foreign law,18 the court should refuse to refer parties to 
arbitration if “in application of its own law, the jurisdiction of its own courts may not be 
ousted”.
In its Sebastian International ruling of 2010, the Court confirmed its previous decision. The 
case  opposed  a  distributor  doing  business  in  Belgium and  a  manufacturer  established  in 
California. Although this has not been mentioned in the ruling, it appears that the agreement 
called for the application of the laws of California. When the manufacturer terminated the 
agreement,  the distributor initiated proceedings before the courts in Belgium. Parties took 
their quarrel all the way up to the Supreme Court. After recalling that Art. II of the New York 
Convention  does  not  determine  which  law  applies  to  the  arbitrability  of  a  dispute,  the 
Supreme Court noted that this provision did not prevent a court from examining the issue of 
arbitrability according to its own law. The Court added that when the arbitration agreement is 
governed by a foreign law, “the court which is seized of a motion to decline jurisdiction in 
favor of arbitration, must deny the possibility to arbitrate the dispute when according to all 
relevant rules of the  lex fori, the dispute cannot be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the 
national court”.
Does this case signal the end of a guerrilla which extended over the last thirty years between 
Belgian  distributors  and  their  foreign  contract  partners?  At  first  sight,  the  ruling  of  the 
Supreme Court brings an end to a long discussion : Belgian courts should from now on resort 
to their own law when deciding upon the arbitrability of disputes, at least when the underlying 
agreement is governed by a foreign law. When doing so, these courts should in particular pay 
attention to Belgian mandatory rules.
The end of a long standing controversy does not,  however,  bring us closer  to the end of 
history. It may well be that Belgian courts now have firmer ground on which to approach 
disputes arising out of the termination of distribution agreements. If these agreements include 
an arbitation clause, account must also be taken of the other side of the story, i.e. the reaction 
of the arbitral tribunal which could also be seized of the dispute. Before exploring the dire 
consequences which could arise out of such parallel proceedings (2), some comments will be 
offered on the position adopted by the Supreme Court in respect of the law applicable to the 
arbitrability of disputes (1).
1. Arbitrability and the law
If it was once at the center of discussion in the arbitration community, the issue of arbitrability 
has today lost much of its acuteness.19 When it is mentioned, the analysis focuses on a few 
selected fields, such as disputes involving securities, intellectual property law or competition 
law. Leaving these specific categories aside, there seems to be a consensus, at least on the 
17 Van Hopplynus  Instruments  v.  Coherent  Inc.  (Supreme  Court,  16  Nov.  2006)  TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH 
HANDELSRECHT (2007) at p. 889.
18 In that case the contract included a choice for the laws of California and an AAA arbitration agreement.
19 According to Born, “The non-arbitrability limits that exist under national law have evolved materially over 
time, with historic skepticism about the arbitral process's ability to resolve particular categories of disputes  
eroding substantially in recent decades” - G.B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009), 
vol. I, at p. 775.
general level : commercial disputes may safely be referred to arbitration, while criminal and 
family law disputes are, broadly speaking, said to be inarbitrable. It has even be said that “in 
principle, any dispute should be just as capable of being resolved by a private arbitral tribunal 
as by the judge of a national court”.20
This broad brush approach is, however, insufficient. Practice indeed reveals that the opinions 
of States on the possibility to submit disputes to arbitration continue to differ, even if the 
differences are not as substantial as they used to be. As there are differences of opinions on 
what disputes may be referred to arbitration,21 there is room for a conflict of laws approach.22
The answer to the conflict of laws conundrum may be to bypass the classical analysis and 
seek the help of a substantive rule, without referring to a specific conflict of laws rule or even 
to  a  national  law  in  order  to  decide  an  arbitrability  issue.  Arbitrators  certainly  have  the 
possibility  to  use  this  type of  reasoning.23 Given the consensus  on arbitrability  in  certain 
fields, resort to a substantive method would not be revolutionary – it is necessary for example 
to refer to the applicable law when determining whether a dispute relating to the sale of shares 
of a company may be referred to arbitration? Experience has, however, shown that arbitrators 
do not systematically resort to the application of a substantive approach when analysing the 
arbitrability of the dispute.24
For  courts,  matters  are  different.  As  the  issue  of  arbitrability  is  linked  with  their  own 
jurisdiction,  there  is  much less  room to resort  to  a  substantive  approach and neglect  the 
choices made by national legislators. This begs therefore the question of what law applies to 
the arbitrability of the dispute. As is well known, the 1958 New York Convention does not 
provide a final answer to this issue. There is a clear distinction between Art. V(2)(a) of the 
Convention, which provides that the enforcing court should look at its own law in order to 
examine whether  the dispute was not  capable of settlement  by arbitration,  and Art.  II(3), 
which is silent on what law governs the issue of arbitrability at the pre-award stage.25
20 N. Blackaby and  C. Partasides,  Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (OUP, 2009),  p. 123, § 
2.112.
21 The fact that the Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985, as amended in 2006)  
remains silent on the issue of arbitrability may also taken as a sign that a consensus on this issue is difficult to  
reach. See art. 1(5) of the Model Law : “This Law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of 
which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to arbitration only according 
to provisions other than those of this Law”.
22 The conflict of laws reasoning is obviously out of place for purely domestic disputes. For these disputes, the  
national  views  on  the  limits  of  arbitrability  are  the  only  one  relevant.  When  one  has  determined  the 
applicable law in relation to an international dispute, the question arises whether the limitations set by that  
law for domestic disputes should be applied without more or whether the international nature of the dispute  
calls for another, more restrained view on arbitrability. The latter view has been adopted by the US Supreme  
Court  which  held  in  1985 that  it  is  “necessary  for  nationals  courts  to  subordinate  domestic  notions  of 
arbitrability  to  the  international  policy  favoring  commercial  arbitration”  (Mitsubishi  v.  Soler  Chrysler-
Plymouth Motors 473 US 614, at 639 (1985)).
23 On the existence and limits of this approach, see E. Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l'arbitrage 
international (Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 60-82.
24 For an analysis of  the practice of  arbitrators  in the field of distribution agreements,  see  C. Truong,  Les 
différends liés  à  la rupture des  contrats  internationaux de distribution dans les  sentences arbitrales  CCI,  
(Litec, 2002), 66 ff.
25 Article VI(2) of the Geneva Convention is more precise. It provides that the courts may refuse recognition of 
the arbitration agreement “if  under the law of their  country the dispute is  not  capable of  settlement by  
arbitration”. See also art. 36(1)(b)(i) of the Model Law, which provides that “Recognition or enforcement of 
an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be refused only ...  if the court finds 
that: (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this  
State”.
The lack of uniform international regime has led to a mixed approach both in court practice 
and in scholarly comment.26 Many courts have resorted to the lex fori to decide apply whether 
to refer parties to arbitration.27 So it is that French courts have used an inarbitrability provision 
found  in  French  law  to  reject  a  motion  to  decline  jurisdiction  in  favor  of  arbitration 
notwithstanding  the  presence  of  an  arbitration  agreement  in  an  individual  contract  of 
employment.28 Italian courts have similarly used Italian law when reviewing the possibility to 
refer to arbitration a dispute concerning the consequences of the UN embargo against Iraq.29 
The  lex fori approach is, however,  far  from universally accepted.  In the famous  Meadow 
Indemnity case, a US District Court refused to approach the question based solely on one 
single national law. The court held instead that “reference to the domestic laws of only one 
country, even the country where enforcement of the arbitral award will be sought, does not 
resolve whether a claim is 'capable of settlement by arbitration'”. The court added that “the 
determination of whether a type of claim is 'not capable of settlement by arbitration' … must 
be made on an international scale, with reference to the laws of the countries party to the 
Convention”.30
Faced  with  this  lack  of  agreement,  views  of  scholars  have  also  diverged.31 Beyond  a 
consensus on the need to resort to a reasoning still firmly coined in terms of classical private 
international law,32 opinions indeed vary. It has been suggested that the question should be 
governed by the law applicable to the agreement.33 According to Hanotiau,34 this would ensure 
that courts and arbitrators apply the same rules. This seems to constitute a notable extension 
26 One may add that the issue of the law applicable to the arbitrability is generally not addressed in national  
arbitration statutes – see e.g. Art. 81(1)(a) of the 1996 UK Arbitration Act.
27 According to Lew, Mistelis  and Kröll,  “in the majority of cases courts  have determined the question of  
arbitrability at the pre-award stage according to their own national law” (J. Lew,  L. Mistelis and  S. Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2003), at pp. 191, § 9-13. See to the same effect  
G.B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009), vol. I, at p. 521.
28 Société Château Tour Saint Christophe et al v Aström (Court of cassation (ch. soc.), 16 Feb. 1999,  REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (1999) 745, with comments  F. Jault-Seseke – in this case, the dispute 
concerned an employment contract signed by a Swedish national, which included an arbitration agreement  
calling for disputes to be settled by an arbitral tribunal under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules. 
The Court held that “la clause compromissoire insérée dans un contrat de travail international n'est pas  
opposable  au  salarié  qui  a  saisi  régulièrement  la  juridiction  française  compétente  en  vertu  des  règles  
applicables, peu imporant la loi régissant le contrat de travail”.
29 Fincantieri – Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA and Oto Melara SpA v Ministry of Defence, Armamement and  
Supply Directorate of Iraq and Republic of Iraq (Court of Appeal of Genua, May 7, 1994), 21 YEARB. COMM. 
ARB. 594 (1996) – the Court referred to the “jurisprudential principle that, when an objection for foreign 
arbitration is raised in court proceedings concerning a contractual dispute, the arbitrabiityof the dispute must  
be ascertained according to Italian law as this question directly affects jurisdiction, and the court seized of the 
action can only deny jurisdiction on the basis of its own legal system” (at pp. 599-600).
30 Meadows Indemnity v Baccala & Shoop Insurance Services, 760 F. Supp 1036 (EDNY 1991).
31 The lack of consensus also appears in how scholars rely on precedents. The US Supreme Court ruling in the  
famous  Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler Plymouth case has been heralded both as evidence of application by 
courts  of  the  lex  fori (J.-F.  Poudret and  S.  Besson,  Comparative  Law  of  International  Arbitration, 
(Thomson/Schulthess, 2nd ed. 2007) at p.  286, § 335 and  G.B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer, 2009), vol. I, at p. 521) and as a sign of an evolution towards the application of a substantive norm 
(B. Hanotiau, “L'arbitrabilité”, 296 Coll. Courses Hague Academy (2003) 87, § 98).
32 It has, however, been suggested that the application of the lex fori does not rest on a conflict of laws rule, but 
rather on the principle of international law that allows each State full competence to regulate the jurisdiction  
of its courts (N. Coipel-Cordonnier, Les conventions d'arbitrage et d'élection de for en droit international 
privé (LGDJ, 1999), at p. 246, para. 239).
33 See e.g. Ph. Fouchard, L'arbitrage commercial international (Dalloz, 1965), para. 186.
34 B. Hanotiau, “What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?' (1996) 12 ARB. INT. 391, 393-5.
of the scope of the  lex contractus.  As it  usually understood,35 the  lex contractus does not 
include  issues  of  dispute  settlement  and  certainly  not  the  possibility  for  parties  to  avail 
themselves of a given dispute resolution method.36
A radically  different  approach  dictates  the  application  of  the  lex  fori to  the  issue  of 
arbitrability. The application of this law which has received much support,37 comports with the 
idea that the issue of arbitrability is intimately tied up with the division of work between 
courts  and arbitral tribunals. Arbitrability is a legal restriction on the freedom enjoyed by 
parties to design their favored dispute resolution method. Further, application of the lex fori 
guarantees that the issue of arbitrability is determined in a similar fashion by a national court,  
whether the question is raised pre- or post-award.
Yet another approach has been suggested, which would submit arbitrability to the law of the 
seat of the arbitration.38 The application of the lex arbitrii may be justified in light of the fact 
that the issue of arbitrability is also a question of whether arbitration is possible at the seat 
chosen by the parties. Noting that “none of the choice-of-law analyses is capable of producing 
coherent or satisfactory results”,39 Born has also offered to concentrate not so much on which 
law applies in general to the question, but rather on the applicability of non-arbitrability rules 
adopted by the various jurisdictions. According to Born, a State would be allowed to apply its 
own mandatory rules if  the dispute involves a claim substantially connected to the State. 
Application of foreign mandatory rules should, in his view, be considered with caution.40
Faced with the difficulty of identifying a single law to govern arbitrability, it has sometimes 
been suggested to refer to a multiplicity of law and verify under various laws whether the 
dispute may be referred to arbitration. This is apparently what Redfern and Hunter suggests, 
when they write that if the issue of arbitrability arises, “it is necessary to have regard to the 
relevant laws of the different States that are or may be concerned”.41 And these authors to 
mention the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of arbitration and the 
law of the ultimate place of enforcement of the award.
In  the  light  of  this  wealth  of  opinions,  is  it  possible  to  adopt  a  clear  cut  solution?  The 
uncertainty surrounding the issue of the law applicable to the arbitrability of a dispute,  is 
apparently as old as the New York Convention itself.42 There are certainly good reasons why a 
35 See e.g. Art. 12(1) of the Rome I Regulation.
36 Application of the lex contractus has been challenged on another ground, i.e. that it could lead to attempts by 
parties to select a law which makes it possible to arbitrate a dispute. Poudret and Besson concludes on this  
basis that “the law chosen by the parties to govern the arbitration agreement is in any case not applicable” 
(J.-F. Poudret and  S. Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, (Thomson/Schulthess, 2nd ed. 
2007) p. 289, § 336).
37 E.g. A. J. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (Kluwer, 1981), at p. 152; J. Lew, L.  
Mistelis and S. Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2003), at pp. 193, § 9-18 : 
these authors not only note that this is the common approach, they also advocate it : “the better view is that  
the law applicable to the question of arbitrability in court proceedings should be governed exclusively by the  
provisions of the law of the national court which determines the case”; H. Arfazadeh, 'Arbitrability under the 
New York Convention : the Lex Fori Revisited', (2001) 17 ARB. INT. 73, 80-83.
38 J.-F. Poudret and  S. Besson,  Comparative Law of International  Arbitration (Thomson/Schulthess,  2nd ed. 
2007) at p. 288, § 336;  M. Danov, 'The law governing arbitrability under the Arbitration Act 1996' [2008] 
LMCLQ 536, 537-541.
39 G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at p. 523.
40 G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at p. 525-526.
41 N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (OUP, 2009), at p. 124, § 
2.115.
42 For an account of the various defended by early commentators of the 1958 Convention, see  A. J. van den 
court could resort to its own law when it determines whether to refer parties to arbitration or 
to conclude that a dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration. Arbitration may well be a 
very adequate method of settling international commercial disputes. The favor arbitrandum is 
a  principle  worth  taking into  account,  as  is  the  need to  respect  the  agreements  made by 
parties. From the perspective of States however, it represents a departure from the process of 
settling disputes by courts. In this sense, application of the lex fori allows a State to determine 
how far parties are allowed to go in ousting the jurisdiction of courts. It does seem therefore a 
natural reaction for a court to pay attention to the limitations contained in its national laws 
when determining whether a dispute may validly be referred to arbitration.43
The application of the lex fori is, however, not without difficulties. According to Poudret and 
Besson, the application of the  lex fori could lead to negative conflicts.44 Born has further 
argued that application of the  lex fori could lead to absurd results when the dispute is not 
connected or at least not substantially connected with the State whose courts are seized.45 This 
presumes, however, that a party could bring the underlying dispute before a court which has 
no substantial connection with the dispute. Take the example of a distribution dispute between 
a distributor operating in Belgium and a German manufacturer, with the contract calling for 
disputes to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland. If the distributor 
brings proceedings in Belgium, in violation of the agreement, the application by a Belgian 
court of its own law, does not seem out of place or resemble the type of parochial reflex often 
denounced by commentators. It  would be different if  the dispute concerned a distribution 
agreement between the same German manufacturer and a distributor operating in France, with 
the  agreement  calling for  disputes  to  be submitted  to  an arbitral  tribunal  with  its  seat  in 
Belgium. In that situation, it  is more difficult  to justify why a court  sitting in Belgium  46 
would resort to its own law.
Does the application of the  lex fori necessarily denote a mistrust of the arbitral process? It 
would be ludicrous to deny that arbitrators are perfectly capable of deciding a dispute between 
a distributor and the manufacturer. When it insists that a rule of inarbitrability is duly taken 
into account, a State does not necessarily repudiate the arbitration mechanism. It only requires 
that one of its laws, which it rightly or wrongly believes is important, should be applied. In 
fact, the practice of Belgian courts has never been one of outright refusal to let distribution 
disputes  be settled  by arbitration.47 The  refusal  is  indeed conditional  upon the refusal  by 
arbitrators to apply Belgian law.48
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (Kluwer, 1981), at p. 153-154, notes 98 to 100.
43 As van den Berg wrote, “the main effect of the arbitration agreement is the exclusion of the competence of  
the courts in favour of arbitration. As a court derives its competence as a rule from its own law, it should  
inquire under its own law whether the competence has lawfully been excluded in favour of arbitration” - A. J.  
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (Kluwer, 1981), at p. 152.
44 J.-F. Poudret and  S. Besson,  Comparative Law of International Arbitration, (Thomson/Schulthess,  2nd ed. 
2007) at p.  288, § 336 – although they have been hard pressed to come up with an example of such a 
situation.
45 G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009), vol. I, at p. 519.
46 The court would have jurisdiction as the seat of the arbitration is located in Belgium (Art. 1717 Belgian  
Judicial Code).
47 Save for a limited number of cases which predate the NSU-Audi ruling of the Supreme Court. These cases are 
discussed by O. Caprasse, Arbitrage et sociétés (Bruyant/LGDJ, 2002), at pp. 67-69, §§ 73-74. The outright 
refusal  to  allow disputes  in  relation to  termination  of  distribution agreements  to  be  arbitrated  has  been  
defended in the past - see e.g. R. Vander Elst, 'Arbitrabilité des litiges et fraude à la loi en droit international 
privé”, Revue critique de jurisprudence belge 354 (1981). This position is no longer defended today.
48 This has given rise to some discussion. It may indeed be difficult for the court to determine what law the  
arbitral  tribunal  will  apply  when  this  tribunal  has  not  yet  been  formed.  When it  has  been  formed,  the 
difficulty  may be  that  the  question  of  the  applicable  law may  be  disputed  before  the  tribunal.  See  the 
Application of the lex fori will inevitably result in surprise for parties who had entered into an 
agreement including an arbitration clause, in the belief that this agreement would be honored 
by courts. A possible solution for this problem would be to leave intact the application of the 
lex fori, but to attempt to persuade national legislators to abandon – even if only gradually – 
the limitations they impose on the arbitrability of selected disputes. One may indeed not like 
the position adopted by the Belgian legislator in 1961, especially as it seems to be biased 
against any other form of dispute resolution than by Belgian courts – a position which is 
untenable today.49 The best way to challenge this position is, however, to plead for a revision 
of the 1961 Act.
This being said, there are very good reasons to argue in favor of the lex contractus or of any 
other approach. As is often the case, the process of selecting the applicable law also rests upon 
the personal inclination of the court or arbitrator. It would certainly be wise to further the 
unification process initiated in 1958 and to adopt a single, uniform choice of law rule dealing 
with arbitrability – provided this is done in a very general way, without focusing on one type 
of dispute. There is indeed probably no worse way to approach this issue than by looking at  
the arbitrability of distribution disputes, at least from a Belgian perspective. Even though it 
may not be unique, the position of Belgium remains fairly isolated. It is therefore suggested 
that this position can hardly be a good starting point for a general discussion on arbitrability 
of disputes.
Harmonization  of  the  conflict  of  laws  standard  would,  however,  not  solve  all  problems. 
Whatever law is chosen by the court seized of the dispute, this court must pay attention to its  
mandatory rules. If the inarbitrability provision is framed as a mandatory rule, the court seized 
of the dispute is required to apply it over and above the normally applicable law – be it the lex  
fori, lex arbitrii or lex contractus.
One may question the wisdom for a State to elevate one of its provisions to the status of 
mandatory provisions – especially when the same State has accepted that parties may validly 
grant jurisdiction to courts of another State.50 The future could in fact bring more limitation to 
the application of such rules – through the impact of EU law which restricts the possibility for 
Member States to rely on their mandatory rules when this constitutes an impediment for the 
comments  on the various  possible  scenarios  by  A.  Nuyts,  'La  loi  belge  du 27 juillet  1961 relative  à  la 
résiliation unilatérale des concessions de vente exclusive à durée indéterminée et l'arbitrage', 112 JOURNAL DES 
TRIBUNAUX,  349,  at  p.  351 (1993).  One of  the questions which remains open is  what  is  the effect  of  an 
undertaking by the manufacturer that the agreement is governed by Belgian law – should a court seized of the  
dispute be satisfied on this basis that  the dispute may safely be referred to the arbitral tribunal? See the 
comments by H. van Houtte, case note Commercial Court of Hasselt Dec. 24, 1996, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH 
HANDELSRECHT, 1997 at p. 270.
49 Although not as a matter of international law. It cannot be argued that by adhering to the 1958 New York  
Convention or another  international  instrument  dealing with arbitration, Belgium has waived its  right  to  
exclude some disputes from arbitration and hence to refuse to recognise and enforce agreements to arbitrate  
such disputes. For a discussion of the limitations that the New York Convention impose on the possibility for  
Contracting  States  to  rely  on  the  non-arbitrability  of  certain  disputes,  see  G.  B.  Born,  International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at pp. 530-535. According to Born, “Contracting States should 
be  permitted  to  adopt  non-arbitrability  exceptions  only  when  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  specifically-
defined, articulated public policies which are non inconsistent with state practice under the Convention” (G. 
B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at p. 775).
50 Choice of court clauses in distribution agreement must be upheld by courts under Art. 23 of the Brussels I  
Regulation. See  e.g.  S.A. Etablissement C. Verswijver & S.A. Eurodiesel v. MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH, 
(Commercial Court of Liège, Dec. 30, 2004).
internal market.51
It remains, however, difficult to challenge the existence of such a mandatory provision. At the 
end of the day, it is highly unlikely that States will accept to abandon all limitations on the 
possibility to refer disputes to arbitration. The suggestion that a State should only adopt a rule 
of  inarbitrability  if  there is  a  consensus  among States  that  the disputes  concerned should 
indeed  be  reserved  to  courts,  is  laudable.52 It  misses,  however,  the  point  of  domestic 
mandatory rules, which are the perfect instrument for local policies.53 The position of Belgium 
is  in  fact  not  unique.  Other  countries  have  indeed from time to  time decided to  prohibit 
arbitration in  relation  to  some commercial  distribution relationships.54 As long as  a  State 
refrains  from  prohibiting  arbitration  altogether  and  keeps  its  inarbitrability  provisions 
restrained to a few, narrowly defined categories of disputes, there is not much one can bring 
against this practice.55
It therefore seems that in some situations, arbitral tribunals and courts will adopt diverging 
analysis of the validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement. This is even more so 
since it seems accepted, at least by some, that the courts will not necessarily apply the same 
rules when reviewing an award than when deciding whether to refer parties to arbitration.56 
One should therefore enquire about the practical consequences of this divergence.
51 The milestone case is Arblade : ECJ, 23 nov. 1999, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and  
Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL, joined cases C-369/96 and 
376/96, ECR [1999] I-8453.
52 See  G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at p. 534. Although one may 
question the idea that if Contracting States are not permitted “to adopt idiosyncratic non-arbitrability rules, 
out of step with those in other jurisdiction”, this would enhance “the Convention's constitutional status” - it is 
far from certain that States which have acceded to the 1958 Convention had the intention to concede such a 
special status to the Convention.
53 As has been noted, “The legislators and courts in each country must balance the domestic importance of 
reserving matters of public interest to the courts against the more general public interest in promoting trade 
and commerce and the settlement of disputes” -  N. Blackaby and  C. Partasides,  Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration, (OUP, 2009), p. 124, § 2.114.
54 See  e.g.  with  regard  to  certain  franchise  disputes,  15  U.S.C.  §  1226(a(2),  under  which  “motor  vehicle 
franchise contract” disputes  are non arbitrable,  save when there is  an agreement post-dispute to refer to 
arbitration. See also the position under Lebanese law, where the Decree-Law N° 34/67 of 5 th August 1967 
prohibits to a certain extent the possibility to submit disputes to arbitration, although this is disputed.
55 Save denouncing the “application of idiosyncratic rules designed to favor local  parties at the expense of 
foreign entities” (G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2009), vol. I, at p. 840). One 
should note that foreign manufacturers have in the meantime had ample time to learn about the peculiarities  
of Belgian law and about the easy way out offered by choice of court agreements.
56 See Company M v. M. S.A. (Brussels Court of Appeal 4 Oct. 1985), 14 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 618 (1989) : the 
Court held that the arbitrability of disputes should be ascertained “according to different criteria depending 
on whether the question arises when deciding on the validity of the arbitration agreement or whe deciding on 
the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award” (at p. 619). Poudret and Besson also accept that the  
reaction of the court could be different depending on whether the question of the arbitrability is raised pre- or  
post-award  (J.-F.  Poudret and  S.  Besson,  Comparative  Law  of  International  Arbitration, 
(Thomson/Schulthess, 2nd ed. 2007) at p. 288, § 336). Hanotiau, however, disagrees : he notes that “The 
concern for concordance between Article II(3) and Article V is rather illusory to the extent that the national 
court which will have to apply Art. II of the NY Convention will not necessarily sit at the place of probable  
enforcement of the award” (B. Hanotiau, 'The Law Applicable to The Issue of Arbitrability', INT'L. BUS. L. J. 
(755), 771-772 (1998/7) – with reference to the Meadows case).
2. Arbitrability and the parties : an unseeming battle?
It is not enough to conclude that the issue of arbitrability of disputes in relation to distribution 
agreements,  may  be  subject  to  divergent  analysis  when  submitted  to  Belgian  courts  and 
arbitral tribunals. True to Professor van Houtte's keen interest for how the law is applied, one 
must also contemplate the practical consequences of this situation. In a nutshell, the result is  
far from satisfactory.
It is indeed not uncommon for parties involved in a dispute in relation to the termination of 
the distribution agreement to start parallel proceedings. When the agreement is terminated by 
the manufacturer,  the distributor  will  file  proceedings  before a  court  in  Belgium, seeking 
payment of the various compensations awarded by the Act. As a reaction to these proceedings 
or  even  before  they  are  started,  the  manufacturer  will  start  arbitration  proceedings,  as 
contemplated by the contract. Although there is not much to be gained from shooting first,57 
there will often be a 'race' to start proceedings. It is not uncommon to see the manufacturer 
file an arbitration request before a court is seized.58
The existence of parallel proceedings imposes a substantial burden on the parties. It may also 
lead to various skirmishes – occasionally, the distributor may for example refuse to appoint an 
arbitrator, hoping to derail or at least frustrate the arbitration proceedings. It could lead to a 
full  blown war when one  of  the  parties  seeks  an  antisuit  injunction  in  order  to  stop the 
concurrent proceedings.59
In order to take the exact measure of the complexities involved in such parallel proceedings, it 
is worth addressing the progress and the consequences of the two proceedings. The debate 
before the Belgian court on the arbitrability of the dispute will be short.60 Applying the case 
law  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  commercial  court  will  most  probably  refuse  to  decline 
jurisdiction,61 as least when it is convinced that the arbitral tribunal will not decide the dispute 
57 Indeed, the lis alibi pendens principle has no bearing on parallel proceedings before state courts and arbitral 
tribunals - although some courts have in the past thought otherwise. See in general H. van Houtte, 'Parallel 
proceedings before State Courts and Arbitration Tribunals. Is there a transnational lis pendens –exception in  
arbitration or jurisdiction conventions ?' in Arbitral Tribunal or State Courts – Who must defer to Whom? 
(ASA Special Series N° 15 – 2001), pp. 35-54.
58 This is what happened in the NSU-Audi case, where the German manufacturer filed an arbitration request in 
Switzerland after terminating the contract. The manufacturer sought declaratory relief to the effect that the 
agreement had been properly terminated and that no compensation was due to the distributor.
59 This is  what  happened in the  Philip Alexander case,  where a  German consumer attempted to avoid the 
application of an arbitration clause included in a contract for investment in futures and options concluded 
with a British brokerage firm. The consumer started proceedings in Germany to obtain compensation for the  
losses  incurred  on  the  future  market.  The  English  brokerage  firm  simultaneously  started  arbitration 
proceedings in England and requested that the English court issue an antisuit injunction to forbid the investor  
to conitnue proceedings before German courts – Philip Alexander Securities and Futures Ltd. v. Bamberger, 
[1997]  ILPr  73,  discussed  in  H.  van  Houtte,  'Misrepresentation  in  Securities  Transactions  in  Europe  : 
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law', in The Law of Cross-Border Securities Transactions (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1999), pp. 215-220.
60 By contrast with the situation in other countries, Belgian arbitration law does not include a principle of 'effet  
négatif de la compétence-compétence' which would limit the examination by the court of the possibility to 
refer parties to arbitration. Comp. with art. 1448 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that 
“Lorsqu'un litige relevant d'une convention d'arbitrage est porté devant une juridiction de l'Etat, celle-ci se  
déclare incompétente sauf si le tribunal arbitral n'est pas encore saisi et si la convention d'arbitrage est  
manifestement nulle ou manifestement inapplicable”.
61 It is worth noting that the court is not required, under Belgian procedural law, to rule first on the motion to 
decline jurisdiction. Unless it  is convinced to do so, the court  will deal with both the motion to decline  
based on the 1961 Act. This is precisely the situation which sought to be avoided by Article II 
of the New York Convention, which imposes an obligation to Contracting States to give effect 
to arbitration agreement. The proceedings will then exclusively turn on the application of the 
various provisions of the 1961 Act,62 with the foreign manufacturer attempting to limit  as 
much as possible the various amounts claimed by the distributor.
Turning to the arbitration proceedings, a key question will  be whether the arbitrators will 
make reference to the 1961 Act. In most cases, the agreement will be expressly subject to a 
foreign law, i.e. that of the manufacturer's main place of business.63 Although the distributor 
may attempt to convince the arbitrators to do so, experience has shown that when the contract 
indeed includes a choice for another law than Belgian law,64 the arbitrators will not be inclined 
to apply to provisions of the 1961 Act.65 66 The refusal by the arbitrators to let the 1961 Act 
dictate their analysis of the arbitrability issue,67 is also unlikely to lead to a successful attempt 
to set the award aside once it is issued.68
jurisdiction and the merits of the case in one and single ruling, which will considerably increase the burden 
on the manufacturer.
62 At least in so far as the distribution agreement granted the distributor the right to represent the manufacturer 
in Belgium. The 1961 Act is not applicable in so far as the agreement also applies to other territories. This  
has given rise to some controversy when a distribution agreement concerns another territory than Belgium, 
but is expressly governed by Belgian law. The Supreme Court has made it clear that in such a case, the 1961  
Act does not apply, save when parties have expressly referred to the Act in their agreement – Nuclear Laser  
Medicine Srl v. Innogenetics (Supreme Court, April 4, 2006), RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 446 (2006-07).
63 The distributor may attempt to argue that he did not freely accept the choice for a foreign law but was forced  
to do so by the manufacturer, who enjoys an economically much stronger position. This line of defense is  
bound to fail as arbitrators will not lightly accept to depart from an express choice of law.
64 On the other hand, when the contract is silent on the applicable law, analysis of ICC arbitration practice has  
shown that arbitrators tend to select the law of the country where the distributor operates – see the analysis by 
C. Truong,  Les différends liés à la rupture des contrats internationaux de distribution dans les sentences  
arbitrales CCI, (Litec, 2002), pp. 157 ff.
65 Drawing on the works of Sperduti and Gothot, an arbitral tribunal has refused to apply the provisions of the 
1961 Act even if it recognized that these provisions constituted internationally mandatory rules : ICC award  
No  6379  (1990)  17  YEAR.  COMM.  ARB.  212  (1992).  The  tribunal  underlined  that  the  Belgian  act  was 
mandatory but that this mandatory nature was only relevant for Belgian authorities. It could be argued that  
the arbitral tribunal has a duty to ensure that its award is enforceable and that it should as such take into 
account mandatory provisions of the place of enforcement (see art. 41 of the 2012 ICC Rules) – see e.g. J.-F.  
Poudret and S. Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, (Thomson/Schulthess, 2nd ed. 2007) at 
p. 285, § 333. This argument is, however, far from decisive : first because it assumes that the award will need 
to be enforced in Belgium – while Belgium could prove irrelevant for the enforcement. Further, the argument 
probably gives too much weight to the duty imposed on arbitrators to ensure that the award is enforceable.  
This duty only seeks to “serve the much more limited purpose of guiding the Court's and arbitrators' actions 
in relation to the arbitration procedure whenever there may be a lacuna in the Rules... [It does not require] the 
Arbitral Tribunal to ensure that the Award would be subject to execution in any particular country” :  Y. 
Derains and E. A. Schwartz, A Guide to ICC Rules of Arbitration, (Kluwer, 2nd ed., 2005) at p. 385).
66 Foreign courts have likewise refrained from applying the 1961 Act even though the European scheme on 
cross-border  contracts  makes  it  possible  for  a  court  to  take  into  consideration  foreign  mandatory  rules 
(formerly Art. 7(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention, now Art. 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation). There is no  
precedent known of a foreign court giving effect to the 1961 Act as foreign mandatory rule (as noted recently  
by P. Kileste, P. Hollander and C. Staudt, La résiliation des concessions de vente. 50 ans d'évolution de la loi 
du 27 juillet 1961 (Anthemis 2011) at p. 203, § 370).
67 See  e.g.  ICC Award  N°  12193 (2004),  published  in  JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2007),  1276,  with 
comments by  E. SILVA-ROMERO (in this case,  the arbitrator refused to take into account the provisions of  
Lebanese law which restricted the possibility to submit  to arbitration disputes  in  relation to  distribution 
agreements. The arbitral tribunal first attempted to narrow down the obligations imposed by the Lebanese  
Act.  It  also held that  since the arbitration took place in Switzerland, the issue of arbitrability should be  
decided on the basis of Swiss law, without taking into account the Lebanese act).
68 If the seat of the arbitration is located in Switzerland, the arbitrators will feel vindicated by the Fincantieri 
case law of the Swiss Supreme Court. In that case, which concerned a request for payment of commissions 
It is not uncommon that the arbitrators conclude their proceedings before the court comes to a 
ruling.  The  manufacturer  may  seek  to  have  the  award  enforced  in  Belgium.  Unless  the 
arbitrators have applied Belgian law to the dispute, this attempt will, however, prove fruitless. 
Could  the  manufacturer  argue  that  enforcement  of  the  arbitral  award  is  prescribed  by  a 
specific enforcement regime – Belgium has concluded a number of bilateral arrangements 
which  aim  to  facilitate  reciprocal  enforcement  of  judgments  and  awards?  Under  these 
arrangements, the arbitrability of the dispute is not mentioned as a requirement for recognition 
or enforcement of the award.69 It is, however, unclear whether enforcement will be granted, as 
the  court  could  be  tempted  to  read  in  these  conventions  a  general  principle  denying 
enforcement when the dispute is deemed not to be arbitrable.70
A more central concern is what happens to the court judgment issued by the Belgian court. If 
the court  decides in favor of the distributor and awards substantial  damages, the question 
arises whether this ruling will be enforced in other countries. Experience has indeed shown 
that the manufacturer often does not have assets in Belgium which could be used to satisfy the 
ruling. This question takes a particular relevance within the EU, since the Member States are 
bound by a very pro-enforcement regime.71
For a long time, the question remained unanswered. Case law did not allow a firm answer.72 
This was in particular true for the position of the ECJ, which had held in the Marc Rich case 
that the mere existence of an arbitration agreement did not take the dispute outside the scope 
of the Brussels I Regulation.73 The Court required that attention be paid to the subject mater of 
the initial claim and not to the objection to the jurisdiction of the court seized of that claim. It  
could be argued on the basis of this ruling that when a court is seized of a dispute in relation 
to  a  distribution  agreement,  the  subject  matter  of  the  dispute  falls  within  the  scope  of 
application of the Regulation, even though there is a preliminary question arising out of the 
existence  of  an  arbitration  agreement.74 Discussing  the  impact  of  this  case  Professor  van 
Houtte argued that if one accepted to apply the Brussels I enforcement regime to the judgment 
due to an agent for sales of war material to Iraq, one party opposing arbitration argued that the commercial  
embargo decided by the international community against Iraq made it impossible to submit to arbitration  
claims arising out of contracts concluded with Iraq. The Swiss Supreme Court  that  the arbitrability of a 
dispute “cannot be denied for the only reason that mandatory provisions of law or a given material public 
policy make the claim null and void or its execution impossible” (Fincantieri-Cantieri navai italiani SpA and 
Oto Melara SpA v M. (Swiss Supreme Court, June 23, 1992) 20 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 766 (1995).
69 The application of the bilateral agreements raises the question of the relationship with the 1958 New York  
Convention.
70 As has been done by the Supreme Court in the  Audi-NSU ruling :  Audi-NSU Auto Union AG v SA Adelin  
Petit & Cie (Court of cassation, June 28, 1979), 5 YEARB. COMM. ARB. 257 (1980) – the Court referred to the 
1959  Swiss-Belgian  bilateral  agreement  and  held  that  even  though  this  convention  did  no  refer  to  the 
arbitrability of the dispute as a condition for enforcement, this requirement could nonetheless be read in the 
treaty.  This  reading  has  been  challenged  -  see  e.g. H.  van  Houtte 'L'arbitrabilité  de  la  résiliation  des 
concessions de vente exclusive', in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À R. VANDER ELST (Nemesis 1987), at p. 824.
71 If enforcement is sought in a country outside the EU where disputes relating to distribution agreements are 
freely arbitrable, it is not excluded that enforcement will be denied. The court addressed could indeed be  
inclined to think that the side-stepping of the arbitration agreement constitutes a violation of its public policy,  
which could include the favor arbitrandum principle.
72 See Assurances générales de France v. Göttgens (Court of Cassation, Nov. 14, 2000), REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 172 (2001), with comments by H. Muir Watt.
73 Marc Rich & Co AG v Societa Italiana Impianti PA (ECJ, July 25, 1991), case C-190/89, ECR [1991] I-3855.
74 Although another reading could be adopted, to the effect that where a party appears in court proceedings to 
argue tha the case should be stayed for arbitration, “arbitration is the subject-matter of the proceedings in the  
claim” and the Regulation should therefore not apply – a reading defended among others by Briggs and Rees 
(A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa, 5th ed., 2009), at pp. 678-680, para. 7.08.
issued by the court, a case could be made that enforcement could be denied on public policy 
ground, as the international obligation to apply the New York Convention is a matter of public 
policy.75
Since the  West Tankers ruling,  there is  more certainty on this disputed issue.76 As is  well 
known, the ECJ decided in this case that if a dispute comes within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation because of the nature of the rights to be protected in the proceedings, then “a 
preliminary  issue  concerning  the  applicability  of  an  arbitration  agreement,  including  in  
particular  its  validity,  also  comes  within  its  scope of  application”.77 As  a  result,  when a 
Member  State  court  decides  incidentally  on  the  existence  or  validity  of  an  arbitration 
agreement, its decision appears to fall within the ambit of the Brussels I Regulation when the 
actual subject matter of the dispute concerns civil or commercial rights.78 As there is no doubt 
that disputes concerning the termination of distribution agreements do fall within the scope of 
application of the Brussels  I  Regulation,  the decision of a  Belgian court  should therefore 
enjoy the benefit of the free circulation regime – unless recognition or enforcement may be 
denied on the basis of a specific ground of refusal.
Parties will therefore be faced with an arbitral award, which may enforced in all States parties 
to the 1958 Convention and a judgment issued by a Belgian court, which could be enforced in 
other EU Member States. Needless to say, this situation is hardly what parties contemplated 
when they agreed that disputes arising out of their distribution agreement would be arbitrated. 
Nor can it be said that this situation comports with ideal of justice.
Unless one of the parties gives in and abandons the fight, the battle will move to a new field : 
after the concurrent proceedings, counsels for the parties will have to deal with conflicting 
rulings.  Let's imagine that the distributor seeks enforcement of the judgment in a country 
where the manufacturer has assets. If this is a EU Member State, the local court will face a 
difficult  choice :  stay true to the European ideal  of free circulation of judgments or give 
priority to the arbitral award in the name of the need to hold parties to their agreement. One 
key question in  this  respect  will  be the role  which could be played by the public  policy 
exception. Could it be said that the existence of an arbitration agreement, which is valid and 
enforceable  according  to  the  court  addressed,  is  a  ground  for  refusing 
recognition/enforcement?  Inevitably,  opinions  may  vary  on  the  possibility  to  rely  on  the 
public  policy  exception  to  deny  recognition  or  enforcement.  Given  the  international 
obligations  assumed  by  all  Member  States  when  they  acceded  to  the  1958  New  York 
Convention and the legitimate concern to hold parties to their  agreement,  reliance on the 
75 H. van Houtte, “May Court Judgments that Disregard Arbitration Clauses and Awards be enforced under the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions ?” 13 ARB. INTL. 1997, 85-92, at p. 88.
76 See in  general  S.  Besson,  'Le statut  au sein de  l'Espace judiciaire  européen d'un jugement  écartant  une 
exception d'arbitrage et statuant sur le fond' in Mélanges de procédure et d’arbitrage en l’honneur de Jean-
François Poudret 329 (Faculté de droit de Lausanne, 1999).
77 Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers (ECJ, Grand Chamber, Feb. 10, 2009), 
case  C-185/07,  ECR [2009],  I-663,  at  para.  26.  The Court  was  concerned  about  the  application  of  the 
Brussels I Regulation to proceedings brought before an Italian court, which concerned a claim for damages 
for damage done to a jetty by a ship. The question of the application of the Regulation was highly relevant : if 
the Regulation did not apply to those proceedings, nothing would have prevented the English court from 
issuing an anti-suit injunction.
78 This conclusion is not shared by everyone. Briggs and Rees consider that there is still room to argue that a  
judgment given by the court of a Member State “is not simply a judgment on the merits of the case”, but that  
“it is a judgment (i) that there is not binding and enforceable obligation to arbitrate”... so that it remains “a  
decision on arbitration which must fall within Article 1(2)(d) and so outside Article 1” (A. Briggs and P. Rees, 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa, 5th ed., 2009), at pp. 680, para. 7.08).
public policy exception seems a perfectly reasonable solution.79 On the other hand, the public 
policy exception must be construed strictly. One should therefore proceed with caution. There 
could be room for a distinction on the basis of the reason which justified the refusal by the 
court of origin to uphold the arbitration agreement. That a court decides that a dispute is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration because of a well established but also narrowly defined 
policy of inarbitrability, may deserve more consideration than the judgment of a court which 
has ignored altogether the arbitration agreement without apparent reason, or which has held, 
because of a traditional policy of narrow reading of such agreements, that the dispute fell 
outside the arbitration agreement.
Yet another question could arise, if one of the parties has sought judicial  back up for the 
arbitration agreement or the arbitral proceedings. This could be the case if the party seeking to 
rely on the arbitration agreement, has sought a declaration from the courts of a Member State 
that the agreement is valid and enforceable. Enforcement of the judgment which has been 
issued on the basis that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable, could be denied in that 
Member State under Article 34(3) of the Regulation.80
By way of conclusion
As Hans van Houtte used to say, a whole generation of commercial practitioners has build up 
a cottage industry on the Belgian Distribution Agreements Act. This practice has received 
additional importance following the adoption of similar provisions for agency agreements and 
franchise agreements.
The  ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Sebastian  International case  has  brought  some 
welcome clarification. It does not, however, allow to turn the page and close this long chapter 
of the history of Belgian arbitration law. The process of determining whether a dispute is 
indeed arbitrable may be easier to handle for a court sitting in Belgium. It remains obscured 
on a more general level by a long-standing debate on the relevant law.
In addition, the net effect of Sebastian International is to enhance the risk of both conflicting 
proceedings and conflicting outcomes, as the court and the arbitral tribunal each wrestle with 
the dispute on their own terms. West Tankers has even increased the room for conflict,81 which 
will turn on the use of the public policy mechanism.
It is now time to reconsider the position? Certainly, it is very difficult to accept that disputes 
regarding the termination of distribution agreements may not be referred to arbitration – or 
only when Belgian law applies – while at  the same time, these disputes could validly be 
79 Unsurprisingly  this  solution  has  been  advocated  by  Briggs  and  Rees  -  A.  Briggs and  P.  Rees,  Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa, 5th ed., 2009), at pp. 681-682, para. 7.08).
80 Another question is whether a judgment could be denied recognition under Article 34(3) of the Regulation on 
the basis that it is irreconcilable with an arbitral award. See the observations of H. van Houtte, “May Court 
Judgments  that  Disregard  Arbitration  Clauses  and  Awards  be  enforced  under  the  Brussels  and  Lugano 
Conventions ?” 13  ARB. INTL. 1997, 85-92, at p. 89-90 and the negative answer in  Republic of Congo v.  
Groupe Antoine Tabet (Cour de cassation, July 4, 2007),  REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 822 
(2007).
81 As acknowledged by AG Kokott in het opinion in the West Tankers case, where she concluded that until “a 
solution by way of law” is adopted, “divergent  decisions must be accepted” (Allianz SpA and Generali  
Assicurazioni Generali  SpA v West  Tankers (ECJ, Grand Chamber,  Feb. 10, 2009),  case C-185/07, ECR 
[2009], I-663, at para. 73).
contracted  out  to  all  courts  of  fellow  Member  States.82 Even  if  one  accepts  that  the 
inarbitrability  of  such  disputes  does  not  denote  a  general  mistrust  of  arbitration,  the 
comparison reveals that the current position is not tenable.
It is probably not for courts in Belgium to suggest new solution. Although another reading of 
the 1961 is not entirely excluded,83 the weight of precedents is so overwhelming that it is very 
unlikely that courts will one day accept that disputes relating to termination of distribution 
agreements could validly be referred to arbitration,  whatever law the arbitral  tribunal will 
apply.
While  some solution  may  come out  of  the  current  process  of  revision  of  the  Brussels  I 
Regulation, one should above all keep Professor van Houtte's advice in mind : when the sea is 
rough and the waves are breaking, you should set yourself a well defined goal not too far 
away  in  the  night  and  keep  sailing.  While  bracing  for  some  heavy  storm,  arbitration 
practitioners should do the utmost to steer the ship to calmer waters. Whether the storm will  
lie is another question.
82 See Société van Hopplynus v. Coherent Inc. (Commercial Court of Brussels, Oct. 5, 1994) 22 YEARB. COMM. 
ARB. 637 (1997) (noting that the mandatory nature of the 1961 Act “does not preclude, for instance that a  
dispute concerning the termination of a distributorship be submitted to a foreign court applying its national 
law, under the provisions of an international convention such as [the Brussels I Regulation]”. Hanotiau has  
argued that “we find it difficult [in light of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation] for Belgian courts to  
persist in contending that the Belgian Statute of 1961 is promoting a policy of the Belgian State which is so  
strong that it “cannot be circumvented by any means' and should be classified in the very narrow category of  
international public policy” : B. Hanotiau, 'The Law Applicable to The Issue of Arbitrability', INT'L. BUS. L. J. 
(755), 774 (1998/7).
83 Compare with the reading given by Lebanese courts of the provision included in the Lebanese Act 34/67,  
article  5  of  which  grants  jurisdiction  to  the  courts  of  the  place  where  the  distributor  is  established 
“notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”. Lebanese courts have apparently ruled that this provision 
does not stand in the way of arbitration agreements, but only prohibits agreements granting jurisdiction to 
another  court  (see  the  case  law  quoted  by   C.  Truong,  Les  différends  liés  à  la  rupture  des  contrats 
internationaux de distribution dans les sentences arbitrales CCI, (Litec, 2002), at p. 94-95).
